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I. JURISDICTION, 
This matter has been certified to this Court by the 
Honorable Judge Thomas Greene of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 41. The matter is 
within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Article 8 Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(1). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
Judge Greene has certified the following question to 
this Court for consideration: 
Does an action for termination of employment based 
upon the public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine for violation of or refusal to violate Federal, other 
state, or Utah law, sound in tort or contract? 
Defendants believe that in order to consider that 
question in the context of this dispute, this Court should also 
examine whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff are 
sufficient to satisfy the public policy exception to the 
at-will employment doctrine as that doctrine has been 
articulated to date by this Court. See Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 41(d) (providing for this Court's review of the 
record in a Rule 41 certification matter in answering the 
substantive question posed by the United States District Court). 
Additionally, defendants believe that the issue 
certified by Judge Greene is mooted by new case law from the 
United States Supreme Court, released after the certification 
of this matter to this Court. Therefore, defendants submit 
that it is appropriate that this Court address the issue of 
whether the certified question has become moot because the 
state law causes of action are preempted by federal law. 
III. NON-CASE LAW AUTHORITY. 
This matter requires the interpretation of several 
portions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seg., including 29 U.S.C. § 1140 
(ERISA Section 510) which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, 
or discriminate against a participant or 
beneficiary for the purpose of interfering 
with the attainment of any right to which 
such participant may become entitled under 
the plan, this title, or the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. 
This matter also requires an interpretation of the 
ERISA preemption clause which is contained at 29 U.S.C § 1144 
(ERISA § 514). The ERISA preemption states: "the provisions 
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of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all state 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt 
under 4(b) [any ERISA-covered plan]." 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff is a former employee of Browning. Plaintiff 
filed a Complaint against Browning and David W. Rich, 
Browning's personnel manager and a member of the committee that 
administers Browning's pension plan, on October 30, 1987. 
That Complaint asserts three causes of action: a 
claim that plaintiff was constructively discharged from 
Browning's employ in violation of ERISA; a claim for breach of 
employment contract; and a claim that his employment was 
wrongfully terminated in violation of Utah public policy. A 
copy of plaintiff's Complaint is included in the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
Plaintiff alleges that by undertaking certain actions 
constituting a breach of his employment contract and a 
violation of Utah public policy, Mr. Rich also violated ERISA. 
Plaintiff's Complaint states: "Defendant Rich's conduct in 
using the Browning Pension Plan as part of the scheme to 
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terminate [plaintiff's] employment in violation of defendant 
Browning's contract with [plaintiff] constitutes a breach of 
defendant Rich's fiduciary duty as a member of the Committee 
which is the Plan Administrator . . . and a violation of . . . 
[ERISA]", Complaint paragraph 14. 
The Complaint further alleges that Browning knowingly 
participated in Mr. Rich's breach of his fiduciary duty as part 
of its own scheme to terminate plaintiff's employment and that 
Browning's participation in Mr. Rich's alleged breach "in 
violation of its contract with [plaintiff] and the public 
policy of the State of Utah constitutes a violation of ERISA." 
Complaint, paragraph 15 (emphasis added). 
On September 27, 1988/ defendants filed a motion 
seeking to dismiss plaintiff's non-federal claims. In that 
motion they argued that plaintiff's state law causes of action 
were preempted by Section 514 (29 U.S.C. § 1144) of ERISA and 
that Utah law did not recognize plaintiff's contract and public 
policy claims. Judge Greene granted that motion in part and on 
December 21/ 1988 dismissed plaintiff's third cause of action 
(wrongful discharge in violation of public policy). He did so 
on the ground that Utah law did not recognize a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge from employment. See Order re 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Non-Federal Claims 
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IHf 1, 3. A copy of that Order has been included in the 
Addendum to this brief. 
After this Court published its decision in Berube v. 
Fashion Center, Ltd,, 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), plaintiff 
persuaded Judge Greene to restore his third cause of action on 
the basis that Utah law now recognizes a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge from employment. 
Judge Greene concluded that the cause of action 
sounded in tort rather than contract and that plaintiff could 
be entitled to an award of punitive damages on that claim. 
Order dated January 23, 1990. A copy of Judge Greene's Order 
is included in the Addendum to this Brief. 
Judge Greene certified that issue to this Court for 
its consideration. 
B. Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review. 
Defendants submit the following undisputed facts which 
are relevant to this Court's determination of the second issue 
articulated by defendants in Section II, supra: whether Utah 
law would recognize the facts asserted by plaintiff as 
sufficient for a finding of discharge in violation of public 
policy, as Utah law recognizes that doctrine. 
1. Plaintiff began his employment with Browning 
in 1953. Deposition of Vern L. Peterson ("Peterson 
Deposition") at 18. 
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2. In 1982, plaintiff became general manager of 
Browning's facility in Arnold, Missouri and moved to Missouri. 
Peterson Deposition at 20. 
3. Plaintiff retired from Browning's employ on 
October 31, 1984. Peterson Deposition at 20. 
4. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he 
was constructively discharged because he "opposed certain 
unlawful actions purposed by other officers and division 
managers of defendant Browning and because he conscientiously 
carried out his duties as Customs Officer and as a corporate 
officer." Complaint, Third Claim for Relief If 23. 
5. Plaintiff further alleges that Browning's 
"discharge of [him] for exercising his duty of loyalty and care 
in the affairs of the corporation and for conscientiously 
performing his duties as Customs Officer as required by the law 
of Utah and the law of the United States violates the public 
policy of Utah and constitutes wrongful termination." 
Complaint, Third Cause for Relief If 24. 
6. At his deposition, plaintiff agreed that 
what "really led" to his separation from Browning was 
"backstabbing" of him by other Browning employees because they 
were "jealous" of plaintiff's rise through the corporate 
ranks. Peterson Deposition at 199-200. 
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7. Plaintiff also felt that his treatment of 
certain customs situation "had something to do with" his 
retirement from Browning. Peterson Deposition at 203. 
8. Plaintiff identified several situations 
dealing with custom law as the basis for his allegations of 
paragraph 23 in his Complaint. Those situations consisted of 
an issue concerning the importation of pistol parts from Japan, 
an incident involving the use of a Browning import permit to 
ship certain Beretta pistols to the United States, a situation 
surrounding the closing of a warehouse in Montreal, and a 
situation involving the importation of golf products. Peterson 
Deposition at 162, 164, 188, 189, 195-196, 192. 
9. According to plaintiff, only Don Gobel, 
President of Browning North America, had (with the possible 
exception of Browning's Board of Directors) actual authority to 
terminate plaintiff's employment relationship with Browning. 
Peterson Deposition at 147-148. 
10. Plaintiff testified concerning the issue of 
the importation of the pistols from Japan that he had a 
conflict with another Browning officer over the issue and 
believed that officer desired him to ignore the instructions 
given to him by Mr. Gobel that plaintiff was to abide by the 
letter and the spirit of customs laws. Peterson Deposition at 
162-166, 191-192. 
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11. Plaintiff did not inform Mr. Gobel of the 
incident and felt that the repercussion from the incident was 
that he was "bad mouthed" for being uncooperative by the other 
Browning officer involved. Peterson Deposition at 162-166. 
12. Concerning the import of the Beretta pistols 
from Italy, plaintiff testified that he had a conflict with 
another Browning officer when he as Customs Officer indicated 
that certain Beretta pistols could not be imported under a 
Browning license. Peterson Deposition at 190-191. 
13. Plaintiff discussed the incident regarding 
the Beretta pistols with Don Gobel who in no way suggested that 
plaintiff should not follow customs regulations. Indeed, 
Mr. Gobel is described by plaintiff as "an incredible stickler 
for adherence to customs practices." Peterson Deposition at 
191-192. 
14. Concerning the closing of a Browning 
facility in Montreal and the customs duties relative to that 
project, plaintiff believed only that his insistence on strict 
adherence to customs practices led to a perception that he was 
not "cooperative." Peterson Deposition at 192-194. 
15. Plaintiff has no reason to disbelieve 
Mr. Gobel when he says that he was unaware of the Montreal 
situation. Peterson Deposition 192-194. 
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16. Plaintiff's final allegation regarding 
customs law is that Don Gobel was on one occasion "not pleased" 
that plaintiff could not achieve the customs preference on 
certain golf products that Mr. Gobel had suggested in a 
memorandum. Peterson Deposition at 196. 
17. The above incidents are the only allegations 
concerning customs law that plaintiff alleges support the 
allegations of paragraph 23 of his Complaint. Peterson 
Deposition at 196. 
18. The only other situation that plaintiff 
alleges in support of his allegations of paragraph 23 regards 
the payment of a particular tax imposed on merchants by the 
state of Missouri. Peterson Deposition at 201-202. 
19. Plaintiff's testimony concerning the 
non-payment of the Missouri tax is that he believed his 
predecessor as manager of the Arnold facility had undervalued 
some inventory for purposes of payment of the Missouri 
Merchant's tax. Plaintiff believed that Mr. Gobel was aware of 
this situation and asked another Browning officer to handle 
it. Peterson Deposition at 182-185. 
20. Plaintiff's testimony on the foregoing issue 
was corroborated by Mr. Gobel at his own deposition, at which 
he testified that he simply asked another Browning officer to 
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investigate the situation with the Missouri tax and take care 
of the problem in Missouri. Mr. Gobel then heard no more about 
the matter. Deposition of Don Gobel at 132-133. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
A. THE ISSUE CERTIFIED BY JUDGE GREENE IS MOOT 
BECAUSE THE PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM ASSERTED BY 
PLAINTIFF IS PRE-EMPTED BY SECTION 514 OF ERISA 
(29 U.S.C. § 1144). 
B. CONSISTENT WITH ITS DECISION IN BERUBE. THIS 
COURT SHOULD FIND THAT ANY CAUSE OF ACTION 
AVAILABLE UNDER UTAH LAW FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
FROM EMPLOYMENT IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
SOUNDS IN CONTRACT AND NOT IN TORT AND THEREFORE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ASSERTED FACTS SUFFICIENT TO 
FALL WITHIN THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT 
WILL DOCTRINE AS IT HAS BEEN ARTICULATED IN THIS 
COURT'S OPINION IN BERUBE. 
VI. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN THE 
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY v. McCLENDON. 59 U.S.L.W. 
4033 (DECEMBER 4, 1990) MOOTS THE ISSUE CERTIFIED 
TO THIS COURT BY JUDGE GREENE. 
As explained above, plaintiff's allegations intermesh 
his claims under Utah law with his claims under ERISA. 
Plaintiff has essentially alleged that Browning used its ERISA 
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governed pension plan as part of a "scheme to terminate 
[plaintiffs] employment in violation of . . . (his contract) 
and the public policy of the State of Utah," Complaint If 15. 
Plaintiff's Complaint explains the relationship 
between defendant Rich's conduct as a Browning pension plan 
fiduciary and Browning's breach of Utah public policy as 
follows: 
Defendant Rich's conduct in using the 
Browning pension plan as part of a scheme to 
terminate [plaintiff's] employment in 
violation of defendant Browning's contract 
with [plaintiff] and the public policy of 
the State of Utah constitutes a breach of 
defendant Rich's fiduciary duty as a member 
of the Committee which is Plan Administrator 
of the Browning Pension Plan . . . and a 
violation of . . . [ERISA]. 
Complaint 1f 14. 
The Complaint goes even further and asserts that Browning 
knowingly participated in Rich's breach of his fiduciary duty 
under ERISA as part of its own scheme to remove plaintiff from 
his employment and asserts that Browning's acquiescence in 
Rich's alleged breach "in violation of its contract with 
Peterson and the public policy of the State of Utah constitutes 
a violation of ERISA." Complaint If 15 (emphasis added). 
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Since the Complaint did not allege a specific section 
of ERISA that had been violated by defendants, defendants posed 
an interrogatory asking plaintiff to identify the section of 
ERISA that they had allegedly violated. In response, plaintiff 
alleged that Section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1140) was breached 
by defendants.1/ 
Section 510 provides: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, find, suspend, expel, discipline, 
or discriminate against a participant or 
beneficiary . . . for the purpose of 
interfering with the attainment of any right 
to which such participant may become 
entitled to under the plan, this title, or 
the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure 
*\\~f U . . . . 
±' Plaintiff's Interrogatory Answers also alleged that 
defendants had violated ERISA §§ 502 and 409 (29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1140, 1132). Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' First Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production Documents, 
Interrogatory No. 1(e). Section 502 is simply the statute 
authorizing civil enforcement of ERISA. Section 409 allows the 
removal of a fiduciary who has violated his duties and requires 
repayment to the plan of monies lost for the breach of 
fiduciary duty. That Section does not create a private cause 
of action for damages. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 87 L.Ed. 2d 96 (1985). Plaintiff has 
not even attempted to cause restoration of any monies to the 
plan. Therefore, plaintiff's only actionable claim under ERISA 
is under Section 510. 
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In answer to defendants' interrogatories, plaintiff 
alleged that Browning and Rich forced Mhim to accept an early 
retirement or face termination and risk losing any retirement 
benefits accrued by him or which he would accrue during the 
remaining years of his employment to full retirement." See 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents/ 
Interrogatory No. 1(d). 
On December 3, 1990 the United States Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Inqersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon, 59 
U.S.L.W. 4033 (December 4, 1990). A copy of that opinion is 
included in the Addendum to this Brief. In that case, 
McClendon sued his former employer under Texas common law 
alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from employment in 
order to prevent his employer from having to continue to make 
contributions to its pension fund on his behalf. McClendon 
made no allegations in his Complaint that any section of ERISA 
had been violated by his employer's conduct. The United States 
Supreme Court held to that even in the absence of such specific 
invocation of ERISA, McClendon's state law cause of action was 
pre-empted. Its reasoning was two fold. First, the Court 
relied on the specific text of Section 514 of ERISA which 
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creates a blanket pre-emption of all state laws as they "relate 
to" any employee benefit plan. See ERISA § 514(a); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a). The Supreme Court reasoned that since the existence 
of a pension plan was a "critical factor" in establishing 
liability under Texas wrongful discharge law, the plaintiff's 
cause of action clearly "related to" an ERISA covered plan. 
Id. at 4035. 
Second, the Court also held that pre-emption was 
particularly in order when ERISA already anticipated the sort 
of wrong plaintiff alleged and provided a remedy therefor. In 
McClendon's case, although he did not plead it as such, he 
clearly had a cause of action under Section 510 of ERISA, the 
same section expressly relied upon by plaintiff. In discussing 
this issue, the Court reasoned that Congress had, by passing 
Section 510 and providing for enforcement of Section 510 
through Section 502 (29 U.S.C. § 1132), created an exclusive 
remedy that was intended to in its own right pre-empt any 
overlapping state law cause of action. The Court held: 
It is clear to us that the exclusive 
remedy provided by § 502(a) is precisely the 
kind of "'special featur[e]'" that 
M,warrant[s] pre-emption1" in this case. 
English, supra, at—(slip op., at 14); see 
also Automated Medical, supra, at 719. As 
we explained in Pilot Life, ERISA's 
legislative history makes clear that "the 
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pre-emptive force of § 502(a) was modeled on 
the exclusive remedy provided by § 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185." 481 
U.S./ at 52; id., at 54-55 (citing H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974)). 
"Congress was well aware that the powerful 
pre-emptive force of § 301 of the LMRA 
displaced" all state-law claims, "even when 
the state action purported to authorize a 
remedy unavailable under the federal 
provision." Pilot Life, 481 U.S., at 55. 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 
U.S. 58 (1987), we again drew upon the 
parallel between § 502(a) and § 301 of the 
LMRA to support our conclusion that the 
pre-emptive effect of § 502(a) was so 
complete that an ERISA pre-emption defense 
provides a sufficient basis for removal of a 
cause of action to the federal forum 
notwithstanding the traditional limitation 
imposed by the "well-pleaded complaint" 
rule. Id., at 64-67. 
Id. 4036. 
Therefore, the issue relating to the content of 
plaintiffs claim for wrongful termination and violation of 
Utah policy has been mooted by the Inqersol-Rand decision 
because the state law cause of action has been entirely 
pre-empted by ERISA. 
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B. CONSISTENT WITH ITS OPINION IN BERUBE, THIS COURT 
SHOULD HOLD THAT ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY IS AN ACTION IN CONTRACT NOT AN ACTION IN 
TORT. 
On March 20, 1989, this Court released its opinion in 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd,. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) and 
in doing so changed forever the face of Utah employment law. 
The Berube opinion (at least on the at-will employment issue) 
contains no majority opinion. Rather, Justice Durham authored 
a lead opinion in which only Justice Stewart concurred without 
further comment. The Chief Justice and Justice Howe concurred 
only in the result of the lead opinion's section on the at-will 
employment rule. Berube at 1050. Justices Hall and Howe found 
no need to go beyond the immediate issue raised by the Berube 
case, that of whether the employer's written policy manual 
should be viewed as part of a total employment contract. 
Justice Zimmerman specifically declined to join in Section V.B. 
of the lead opinion which contained Justice Durham's discussion 
of the exceptions to the at-will employment rule. Berube at 
1051. 
Defendants believe that this Court in Berube did not 
expressly recognize a public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine. Rather, two members of this court, Justices Stewart 
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and Durham in a dicta statement (since Ms. Berube's claim had 
nothing to do with public policy) acknowledged that Utah law 
should recognize such an exception. Justices Hall and Howe 
found no need to comment on the matter, while Justice Zimmerman 
expressed a desire to at some point recognize such a cause of 
action but declined to do so in Berube. Justice Zimmerman was 
adamant in his reasoning concerning the sort of damages that 
should be recoverable at such time as the Court may choose to 
recognize that cause of action. He stated: 
I am of the view that any cause of action 
that may accrue to an employee discharged in 
violation of public policy would not 
ordinarily be in tort. I would embed the 
public policy exception in the law by 
holding that every employment contract has 
an implied-in-law covenant that the employee 
will not be discharged in violation of 
public policy. Absent proof sufficient to 
show an independent tort, damages 
recoverable for a breach of that covenant 
would be measured by contract principles 
only. 
Berube at 1051. 
In support of his reasoning on that point, Justice 
Zimmerman cites to Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985). 
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In that case, this Court found that an insured has no 
ability to sue his insurer for tort damages for a bad faith 
refusal to settle a claim directly levied by the insured. In 
reaching that conclusion, this Court reasoned that an insurer's 
duty to treat its insured in good faith or to bargain or settle 
a claim is merely one aspect of the general duty of good faith 
and fair dealing that is implied in all contractual 
relationships. Beck at 798. The Court specifically rejected 
the reasoning of a majority of courts that tort damages are 
appropriate in order to provide insurers with an incentive to 
fulfill their duties to their insureds promptly. Beck at 799. 
This court rejected that reasoning on the basis that the 
concept of contractual damages is in itself broad enough to 
provide ample compensation. Beck at 801. Beck also made it 
clear that tort damages could appropriately be levied against 
the insurer if its conduct was independently actionable under 
tort law. Beck at 803. 
Defendants believe that this analysis is appropriately 
applied to the public policy exception to the at will 
doctrine. If the employer's conduct is independently tortious, 
nothing in Utah law prevents an employee from recovering for 
that tort. 
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Justice Zimmerman's approach, which Justices Durham 
and Stewart do not disagree with or even comment upon, also 
avoids having the full brunt of the ambiguity inherent in 
defining public policy fall on employers. As Justice Durham 
stated in the lead opinion in Berube, the term public policy is 
frequently applied with no precise definition. Berube at 
1043. Even Justice Durham's further refinement that the 
exception to the at-will doctrine must involve "substantial and 
important" public policies is of little aid in prospectively 
guiding an employer's behavior. Defendants submit that it is 
inherently inequitable for the law to impose a burden that can 
be enforceable by the imposition of punitive damages on 
employers in the absence of independently tortious conduct on 
their part based on the employer making an employment decision 
that is not expressly prohibited by statute but is later 
determined to violate some "substantial and important" public 
policy not articulated at the time of the employer's conduct. 
Defendants' reasoning in this regard is consistent with Judge 
Aldon Anderson's applications of Utah law in Howcroft v. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514 
(D. Utah 1989). He analyzed Berube and came to the conclusion 
that "the Utah Supreme Court has not yet recognized tort 
remedies for wrongful termination." Id. at 1522. 
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Defendants' position is also buttressed by this 
Court's unanimous statement in Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989) that in Berube, the court "refused to 
recognize a variety of wrongful discharge actions sounding in 
tort." Lowe at 670. It is noteworthy that in Lowe, the 
Supreme Court upheld/ without comment/ the district court's 
dismissal of a tort claim for a public policy violation. 
In sum, this Court has not held that an employee 
terminated in violation of public policy should be entitled to 
tort damages. Indeed a contrary conclusion would be contrary 
to the principles articulated by Judge Zimmerman's concurring 
opinion in Berube and by the unanimous opinion of this court in 
Beck. 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ALLEGED FACTS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER THE 
STANDARDS SET FORTH BY THIS COURT UNDER THE LEAD 
OPINION IN BERUBE. 
The lead opinion in Berube makes it plain that the 
Utah Supreme Court intends to "construe public policies 
narrowly and will generally utilize those based on prior 
legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions/ applying only 
those principles which are so substantial and fundamental there 
can virtually be no question as to their importance for 
promotion of the public good." Berube at 1043. Plaintiff's 
-20-
Complaint articulates no specific public policy embodied in a 
statute or judicial opinion (or anywhere else) that he alleges 
was violated by Browning in terminating his employment• 
Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Gobel asked him to 
violate any laws, nor does he allege that his employment was 
terminated because he refused to violate any law. The 
uncontroverted testimony of plaintiff fails to link Mr. Gobel 
(the only Browning officer whom plaintiff recognizes as having 
power to terminate his employment) to any knowledge of the 
alleged customs violations proposed by other officers or 
plaintiff's refusal to participate therein, with the exception 
of the incident involving the importation of Beretta pistols. 
In regard to that incident, plaintiff testified that Mr. Gobel 
did not request him to engage in any impropriety. Facts 13, 
14. Plaintiff has acknowledged that to have done so would have 
been entirely out of character for Mr. Gobel who was, according 
to plaintiff, an incredible stickler for adherence to customs 
practices. Fact 13. 
The allegations linking Mr. Gobel to the Missouri tax 
situation are even more attenuated. Mr. Gobel's uncontroverted 
testimony (and the testimony of plaintiff on the same issue) 
indicates that Mr. Gobel did not concern himself with the tax 
situation in Missouri and simply asked another corporate 
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officer to investigate. Fact 21. Mr. Gobel then heard no more 
about the incident. Therefore, Mr. Gobel could not have been 
influenced in any way by it in making any decision relative to 
the termination of plaintiff's employment by Browning. 
Thus, even if plaintiff's allegations are accepted as 
true, plaintiff has failed to articulate a public policy 
violated by Browning that has its origin in a judicial decision 
or legislative enactment that embodies the policy "so 
substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no 
question as to [its] importance for promotion of the public 
good." Berube at 1043. Rather, plaintiff has alleged nothing 
more than he thinks that his attitude towards certain customs 
practices and his rather attenuated involvement in and 
knowledge of Browning's payment practices regarding a 
particular Missouri Merchant's tax were somehow connected to 
his separation from Browning. Even if believed, those 
allegations are insufficient to establish a violation of public 
policy actionable under the lead opinion in Berube. 
Finally, although Judge Greene has phrased the issue 
he certified as one that assumes that Utah law will recognize 
as the source of the public policy "federal, other state, or 
Utah law," that conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
lead opinion in Berube. As a matter of public policy, Utah has 
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little (if any) interest in enforcing principles of federal or 
other state law. In this case, the state has no conceivable 
public policy interest to vindicate by concerning itself with 
whether a Missouri tax imposed on corporations storing 
inventory in that state was complied with. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendants respectfully submit 
that this Court should determine that plaintiff's state law 
causes of action are preempted by Section 514 of ERISA (29 
U.S.C. § 1144). Alternatively, if this Court finds that 
plaintiffs cause of action for discharge in violation of 
public policy is not preempted, this Court should rule that 
that cause of action sounds in contract and not in tort and 
that punitive damages are not available thereunder. Finally, 
defendants request that should this court determine that a 
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine exists, and is 
compensable either in tort or in contract, it hold that the 
facts as alleged by plaintiff in his undisputed deposition 
testimony are insufficient to maintain a cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy under Utah law. 
Respectfully submitted this as day of January, 1991. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
William B. Bohlmg 
Sharon E. Sonnem 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I^tfS Uv day of January, 
1991/ I caused to be mailed/ postage prepaid/ a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONERS/ to the 
following: 
David B. Havas 
Michelle E. Heward 
David B. Havas & Associates 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
^Kcr^ci^X^ &- ^<X^V^^^yy\/\JL^^ 
B 5/ses/tc 
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VIII. ADDENDUM 
Elizabeth T. Dunninq 
WA^KISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah 
corporation, and 
DAVID VI. RICH, 
Defendants, 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 87-NC-=121G 
Jury Trial Demanded 
Vern L. Peterson alleqes as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Vern L. Peterson ("Peterson") is a resident of 
South Oqden, Utah. 
2. Browninq is a corporation organized under the 
laws of the State of Utah and having its principal place of 
business in Morqan, Utah. 
3. David W. Rich is a resident of Weber County, Utah, 
and at all times material to this Complaint was the Personnel 
Director of defendant Browning and a member of the Committee 
which is the Plan Administrator of the Employees' Pension Plan 
of Browning and other Adopting Companies ("Browning Pension 
Plan"). 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pur-
suant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S 
§1132, and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 
5. This Court has pendent jurisdiction over plain-
tiff's state law claims because the state and federal claims 
set forth arise from a common nucleus of operative facts. 
6. Venue is proper in this Court because the brea( 
occurred in this district and the defendants are found in th: 
district. 
FACTS 
7. In 1953 plaintiff Peterson began employment wi1 
Browning as a sales correspondent. 
8. For the next 31 years Peterson continued to woi 
for Browning and received numerous promotions. In 1981 Petei 
was promoted to Vice President of Browning and was appointed 
Customs Officer and Corporate Secretary of Browning. 
9. In August 1982 Peterson was transferred to the 
Arnold, Missouri facility of Browning as general manager. Pi 
to Peterson's transfer Browning agreed that it would continue 
to employ Peterson as general manager of the Arnold facility 
jfor six years until he reached age 60 and would pay the cost 
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of Peterson's relocation to Missouri and back to Utah. 
10. At all times during his employment Peterson's 
performance was satisfactory. During the time he was a vice 
presidentf he exercised the duties of loyalty and care in the 
conduct of the affairs of Browning required of a corporate officer, 
During the time he was Customs Officerf Peterson fulfilled the 
duties of that position with diligence and care. 
11. On October 31, 1984, Peterson was constructively 
discharged from his employment by ^ Browning. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
12. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 11 above. 
13. Defendant Rich failed to discharge his duties 
with respect to the Browning Pension Plan solely in the inter-
est of participants and beneficiaries and instead manipulated 
the Plan to coerce Peterson's early retirement as part of a 
scheme to terminate Peterson's employment. 
14. Defendant__Rich's conduct in using the Browning 
Pension Plan as part of a scheme to terminate Peterson's employ-
ment in violation of defendant Browning's contract with Peterson 
and the public policy of the State of Utah constitute^ a breach 
of defendant Rich's fiduciary duty as a member of the Committee 
which is the Plan Administrator of the Browning Pension Plan 
and a violation of the Employee Retirement Security Act, 29 
U.S.C. §1001, et seq. (ERISA). 
15. Defendant Browning's knowing participation in 
defendant Richfs breach of fiduciary duty as part of its schei 
to terminate Peterson's employment in violation of its contra< 
with Peterson and the public policy of the State of Utah consi 
tutes a violation of ERISA. 
16. As a result of defendants' conduct as aforesaic 
Peterson has lost salaryr bonuses and fringe benefits, includ: 
contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
17. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 16 ab< 
18. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
plaintiff on October 31, 1984, constituted a breach of its si: 
employment contract with Peterson. 
19. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
Peterson after 31 years of loyal and satisfactory service witl 
any notice of dissatisfaction with his performance, without 
any opportunity for him to respond to criticism and without 
any investigation of the criticisms breached defendant Brownii 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its contract of employ-
ment with Peterson. 
20. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
•j Peterson without notice of performance deficiencies and an opj 
jjtunity to improve violated Browning's policy and practice of 
»! giving employees oral and written warnings and an opportunity 
ijto improve prior to termination and constituted a breach of 
: t 
'I 
nits contract of employment with Peterson. 
21. As a result of Browning's breaches as set forth 
| above, Peterson has lost salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, 
including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
22. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 21 above. 
23. Peterson was constructively discharged because 
he opposed certain unlawful actions proposed by other officers 
and division managers of defendant Browning and because he consci-
entiously carried out his duties as Customs Officer and as a 
corporate officer. 
24. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
Peterson for exercising his duty of loyalty and care in the 
affairs of the corporation and for conscientiously performing 
his duties as Customs Officer as required by the law of Utah 
and the law of the United States violates the public policy 
of Utah and constitutes wrongful termination. 
25. Defendant Browning's wrongful termination of 
I Peterson has caused Peterson to lose salary, bonuses and fringe 
(benefits, including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan 
account, and to suffer mental anguish, embarrassment and humilia-
I tion. 
jj WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows: 
i 
II 
i] 1. On his first claim for relief, for lost salary, 
;! 
I; 
•I 5 
bonuses and frinae benefits, including contributions to his 
Browning Pension Plan account, with interest; for punitive dc 
and for attorneys fees; 
2. On his second claim for relief, for lost salarj 
bonuses and fringe benefits, including contributions to his 
Browning Pension Plan account/ with interest; 
3. On his third claim for relieff for lost salary, 
bonuses and fringe benefits, including contributions to his 
Brownina Pension Plan account, with interest; for general dan 
in an amount to be determined at trial and for punitive damac 
in an amount not less than $500,000; 
4. And for costs and for such other relief as the 
Court deems proper. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Plaintiff's Address: 
813 E. 5750 S. 
South Oqden, Utah 84 405 
y By ^ll-U-O^Kl h) Elizabeth T. Dunning 310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
VERN L. PETERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and states 
that he resides at 813 E. 5750 S.f South Ogdenf Utah 84405; 
that he is the plaintiff named in the foregoing complaint; and 
that tie has read the foregoing complaint and that the allega-
tions therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief. 
VERN L. PETERSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this A 0 day of 
October, 1987. 
^;A,UL^U sit r ^ - ^ W 
otary Public , ^ 
My commission expires: 
Residing in ^y^/^,, ~V/7'x</, 
S^li«;TScSfe^E,VED CLERK 
0EC73 |n *?JKD$l6 1988 
** A ^ S . DISTRICT COURT 
D a v i d R. M n n g y B ^ I l S R / f f ? ^ ? ) 
Sharon E. Sonnenj^0cfir(mSB<#4918) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
NON-FEDERAL CLAIMS 
Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal 
Claims were heard before the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United 
States District Court Judge, on December 5, 1988. Plaintiff 
was represented by David Bert Havas and Michelle E. Heward of 
David Bert Havas & Associates. Defendants were represented by 
David R. Money and Sharon E. Sonnenreich of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough. 
The court, having considered the arguments of counsel, 
finds the following: 
1, Defendants* Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's state 
law claims on the basis that they are pre-empted by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, et 
sea, is denied; 
2, Defendants* Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiff's state law 
claims on the basis that this court lacks pendent jurisdiction 
is denied; and 
3, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Third 
Cause of Action (Wrongful Discharge) pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is hereby granted and plaintiff's 
Third Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this day of December, 1988. 
Copies mailed to counsel, 12-27-88jm gy ^HE COURT: 
David B. Havas, Esq. 
David R. Money, Esq. 
^ M A ^ " 
Thomas Greene 
United States District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Bert Havas 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTICOURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
V. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BROWNING, a Utah Corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
The above matter came on regularly for hearing on 
December 7, 1989 on Defendants' Motion for Certification for 
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay. David Bert Havas and Michelle E. 
Heward represented plaintiff, and Sharon Sonnenreich represented 
defendants. The court heard oral arguments and reviewed 
extensive briefs. Being fully advised, the court now enters its 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
The Court denies defendants' Motion for Certification 
to the Tenth Circuit. 
The issue before the Court is driven by Utah law. It 
is clear to this court that the Utah Supreme Court recognizes a 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine,' 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989);2 Loose 
v. Nature-All Corporation, 1989 Utah Lexis 146 (Utah Nov. 27, 
1989) . The majority in Loose said: "The post Berube exceptions 
to the employment at will doctrine in Utah include termination in 
violation of public policy, . . . " Howcroft v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 712 F.Supp. 1514 (D. Utah April 28, 
1989), cited by the defendants is not inapposite. The public 
policy exception recognized in Berube was not at issue in 
Howcroft and Judge Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it. 
This Court rules that an action for wrongful 
termination based upon the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine is an action founded upon tort rather than 
contract. The general rule in states recognizing such an 
exception characterize it as the tort of wrongful discharge.3 
1
 This exception protects an at-will employee from being 
discharged for a reason or in a manner that contravenes sound 
principles of established and substantial policy. 
2
 Although there was no majority opinion in Berube, the 
Plurality opinion as well as Justice Zimmermann's concurrence 
indicated willingness to recognize a public policy exception. 
3
 Arthur S. Leonard in his law review article, A New Common 
Law of Employment Termination, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, 
631 (1988) reviews reported cases and says: In Order to prevent an 
employer from acting contrary to an important public policy, some 
state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge" as an 
exception to the at will presumption. ... Courts faced with a 
public policy argument have searched for an existing label to place 
on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently described 
2 
The clearest statement which appears to indicate the direction of 
Utah law on this matter is Justice Durham's plurality opinion in 
Berube; "Where an employee is discharged for a reason or in a 
manner that contravenes sound principles of established and 
substantial policy, the employee may typically bring a tort 
action against his employer" (emphasis added). Berube at 104 2 
The rulings set forth in this memorandum decision and 
order will become the law of this case unless within 3 0 days 
after the date hereof a party or the parties jointly, on motion 
supported by memorandum and necessary documentation, request this 
court to certify the issues to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. If such a 
motion is filed, the court will set the matter for argument. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January ^ ^ 3 1990. 
./TffOMAS G] 
A yQUc-,-^ . 
J./THOMA  REENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: c n s l 1/24/90MP: 
David Havas, Esg. 
David R. Money, Esq. 
i t a s a t o r t of wrongful d i s c h a r g e . . . . " (emphasis added) I d . a t 
6 5 8 - 6 6 2 . 
3 
— is significant that cases construing'forge'under other 
'federal statutes have generally drawn a distinction be-
tween false or fraudulent statements and spurious or fie-
~ - "titious makings." 370 U. SM at 658 (footnote omitted). 
We should have rejected the argument in precisely those 
terms today. Instead, the Court adopts a new principle that 
can accurately be described as follows: "Where a term of art 
has a plain meaning, the Court will divine the statute's pur-
pose and substitute a meaning-more appropriate to that 
purpose." - '"'. -'•*' • " - ' - ' V * '*" 
I feel constrained to mention, though it is surely superflu-
ous for decision of the present case, the so-called Rule of Len-
ity—the venerable principle that "before a man can be pun-
ished as a criminal under the federal law his case must be 
plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some stat-
ute." United States v. Grodwell, 243 U. S. 476, 485 (1917) 
(internal quotation omitted). See also, McNally v. United 
States, 483 U. S. 350, 359-360 (1987). As JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL explained some years ago: 
"This principle is founded on two policies that have long 
been part of our tradition. First, a fair warning should 
be given to the world in language that the common worid 
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain 
line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possi-
ble the line should be clear.' McBoyie v. United States, 
2S3 U. S. 25,27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) . . . Second, because 
of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because 
criminal punishment usually represents the moral con-
demnation of the community, legislatures and not courts 
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies 
the instinctive distaste against men languishing in 
prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.' 
H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and The Reading 
of Statutes, in Benchmarks, 196, 209 (1967)." United^ 
States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-349 (1971). 
"Falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited" had a 
plain meaning in 1939, a meaning recognized by five Circuit 
courts and approved by this Court in Gilbert. If the Rule of 
Lenity means anything, it means that the Court ought not do 
what it does today: use an ill -defined general purpose to over-
ride an unquestionably clear term of art, and (to make mat-
ters worse) give the words a meaning that even one unfamil-
iar with the term of art would not imagine. The temptation 
to stretch the law to fit the evil is an ancient one, and it must 
be resisted. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
"The case must be a strong one indeed, which would jus-
tify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of 
words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention 
which the words themselves did not suggest. To deter-
mine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its 
language must authorise us to say so. It would be dan-
gerous, indeed, to carry the principle that a case which is 
within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its 
provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in 
the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred 
character, with those which are enumerated." United 
„. States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 96 (1820). 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
DENNIS M. HART. Washington, D.C., for petitioner, STEPHEN L. 
NIGHTINGALE, Assistant to the Attorney General (KENNETH W. 
STARR, Sol. Gen., EDWARD S.G. DENNIS JR., Asst. Atty. GcnM 
WILLIAM C. BRYSON, Dpty. Sol. Gen., CHRISTINE DESAN 
HUSSON, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., and JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ, 
Justice Dept. Atty., on the briefs) for respondent. 
'~±-rJj'l 'III' " • - . . . : K o - ^T 1 2 9 8 ' ^ : . . ; ' : " . T ^ ; ' - - : 
•"'INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, PETITIONER v. -
- ' > - • - • • • ; PERRY McCLENDON/ V;;;\:;"*"y 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 
" " - • - ' . ' ' Syllabus _ 
No. 89-1298. Argued October 9,199C-Leaded December 3, 1990 -
After petitioner company And respondent McClendon, he filed a wrongful 
discharge action under various state law jort and contract theories, al-
leging that a principal reason for his termination was the company's de-
sire to tvoid contributing to his pension fund. The Texas court granted 
the company summary judgment/ and the State Court of Appeals af-
firmed, ruling that McClendon's employment was terminable at wflL 
The State Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that 
public policy required recognition of an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine. Therefore, recovery would be permitted in a wrongful 
discharge action if the plaintiff could prove that 'the principal reason for 
his termination was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or 
paying benefits under the employee's pension fund." In distinguishing 
federal cases holding similar claims pre-empted by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the court reasoned that 
McClendon was seeking future lost wages, recovery for mental anguish, 
and punitive damages rather than lost pension benefits.-
Held: ERISA's explicit language and its structure and purpose demon-
strate a congressional intent to pre-empt a state common law claim that 
an employee was unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainment of 
benefits under an ZEISA-covered plan. 
(a) The cause of action in this case is expressly pre-empted by f 514(a) 
of ERISA, which broadly declares that that statute supersedes all state 
laws iincluding decisions having the effect of law) that "reiau to" any 
covered employee benefit plan. In order to prevail on the cause of ac-
tion, as formulated by the Texas Supreme Court, a plaintiff must plead, 
and the trial court must find, that an ERISA plan exists and the em-
ployer had a pension-defeating motive in terminating the employment. 
Because the existence of a plan is a critical factor in establishing liability. 
infl :fl& tfiii courts inq'^ ry ~asi«bfcju>ected to the plan, this judicially 
crea:ed cause 01 ac:ion(S,ea:feisJ to^n aiKlSA pian. CI. .Slackey v. 
tamer Louecu&n jiyciiiy ld Sit\ice.'7vc., 4S6 U. S. 825, £25. Id., at 
841, and For Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyrr*. 4S2 U. S. 1, 12. 23. distin-
guished. In arguing that the plan is irrelevant to the cause of action 
because all that is at issue is the employer's improper motive, Mc-
Clendon misses the point, which is that under the state court's analysis 
there simply is vo cause of action if there is no plan. Similarly unavail-
ing is McClendon's argument that J514(cX2)—which defines "State" to 
include any state instrumentality purporting to reguiate the terms and 
conditions of covered plans —causes $ 514(a) to pre-empt only those state 
laws that affect pian terms, conditions, or administration and not those 
that focus on the employer's termination decision. That argument mis-
reads § 514(cX2) and consequently misapprehends its purpose of expand-
ing ERISA's general definition of "State" to "include" state instrumen-
talities whose actions might not otherwise be considered state law for 
pre-emption purposes; would render f 514(a)'s "relate to" language su-
perfluous, since Congress need only have said that "all" state laws wouid 
be.pre-empted; and is foreclosed by this Court's precedents, see Mackey, 
supro, at 82S, and n. 2, 829. Pre-emption here is also supported by 
§ 514(a)'s goal of ensuring uniformity in pension law, since allowing state 
based actions like the one at issue might subject plans and plan sponsors 
to conflicting substantive requirements developed by the courts of each 
jurisdiction. 
' (b) The Texas cause of action is also pre-empted because it conflicts 
directly with an ERISA cause of action. McClendon's claim falls 
squarely within ERISA 5 510 which prohibits the discharge of a plan par-
ticipant for the purpose of interfering with [his] attainment of any rigfct 
# . . . under the plan." However, that in itself does not imply pre-
emption of state remedies absent "special features" warranting pre-
emption. See, c. p., English v. General EUctric Co., 496 U. S. . 
——. Such a "special featurfe]" exists in the form of § 502(a), which 
authorizes a civil action by a plan participant to enforce ERISA's or the 
plan's terms, gives the federai district courts exclusive jurisdiction of 
such actions, and has been held to be the exclusive remedy for rights 
guaranteed by ERISA, including those provided by $ 510, Pilot Life Jus. 
- ..«- v . , i » c u wiute s l-./\ w W LL-IY 12-4 
Co. v. Dtdeauz% 481 U. S. 41, 52, 64-65. Thus, the l o w court's it-
temp; to distinguish this cast as no: one within ERISA's purview is 
without merit. . Moreover, since there is no basis in 1602(a)'i language 
for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek "pension benefits," 
- it is dear that the relief requested here vs well within the power of fed-
eral courts; the fart that a particular plaintiff is not seeking recovery of 
pension benefits is no answer to a pre-emption argument. 
779 S. W. 2d 69. rtversed. 
O'CowoR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous. Court with respect 
to Pans I and II—B, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-A, 
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, 
J J., joined. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* 
This case presents the question whether the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 
as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq., pre-empts a state 
common law claim that an employee was unlawfully dis-
charged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a plan 
covered by ERISA. 
I 
Petitioner Ingersoll-Rand employed respondent Perry 
McClendon as a salesman and distributor of construction 
equipment. In 29S1, after McClendon had worked for the 
company for nine years and eight months, the company fired 
him citing a companywide reduction in force. McClendon 
sued the company in Texas state court, alleging that his 
pension would have vested in another four months and that 
a principal reason for his termination was the company's de-
sire to avoid making contributions to his pension fund. 
McClendon did not realize that pursuant to applicable regula-
tions, see 29 CFR §2530.200b-4 (1990) (break-in-service 
regulation), he had already been credited with sufficient 
service to vest his pension under the plan's 10-year require-
ment. McClendon sought compensatory and punitive danh^_ 
ages under various tort and contract theories; he did not as-
sert any cause of action under ERISA. After a period of 
discover}*, the company moved for, and obtained, summary 
judgment on all claims. The State Court of Appeals af-
• firmed, holding that McClendon's employment was termi-
nable a: will. 757 S. W. 2d S16 (19SS). 
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded for trial. The majority reasoned that notwith-
standing the traditional employmen:-at-will doctrine, public 
policy imposes certain limitations upon an employer's power 
to discharge at-will employees. Citing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Title HOB (Vernon 1988 pamphlet), and §510 of 
ERISA, the majority concluded that "the state has an inter-
est in protecting employees' interests in pension plans." 779 
S. W. 2d 69, 71 (1989). As support the court noted that 
"[t]he very passage of ERISA demonstrates the great signifi-
cance attached to income security for retirement purposes." 
Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that under Texas law a 
plaintiff could recover in a wrongful discharge action if he es-
tablished that "the principal reason for his termination was 
the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying bene-
fits under the employee's pension fund." Ibid, The court 
noted that federal courts had held similar claims pre-empted 
by ERISA but distinguished the present case on the basis 
that McClendon was unot seeking lost pension benefits but 
•JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLAOOIUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join 
Parts I and Il-B of this opinion. 
[was] instead seeking future lost wages, mental anguish 
punitive..damages as a result.of the wrongful dischai 
il±-f at.71, n.-3 (emphasis in original).;-~ „., v. .,»"--i:V. 
Because this issue has divided-state and federal-con: 
we granted certiorari, 494 U. S. — - (1990), and 
reverse, 
II 
"ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to pror 
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in empli 
benefit plans." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S 
90 (1983). "The statute imposes participation, funding, 
vesting requirements on pension plans. It also sets var 
uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, 
closure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension 
welfare plans." Id., at 91 (citation omitted). As part of 
closely integrated regulatory system Congress included \ 
ous safeguards to preclude abuse and "to completely sei 
the rights and expectations brought into being by this 1; 
mark reform legislation." S. Rep. No. 93-127, p. 36 (IS 
Prominent among these safeguards are three provision 
particular relevance to this case: i514(a), 29 U. S. C. Si: 
ERISA's broad pre-emption provision; §510, 29 U. S 
§ 1140, which proscribes interference with rights protec 
by ERISA; and § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), a "'caref 
integrated'" civil enforcement scheme that "is one of the 
sential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes 
ERISA." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeauz, 481 U. S. 41, 
54 (1987). 
We must decide whether these provisions, singly oi 
combination, pre-empt the cause of action at issue in * 
case. M[T]he question whether a certain state action is j 
empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. " 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.'" Al 
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U. S. 202. 208 (1985) (intei 
quotation omitted) (quoting M alone v. Write Motor Coi 
435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). To discern Congress' intent 
examine the explicit statutory language and the struct 
and purpose of the statute. See FMC Corp. v. Hollid 
498 U. S. , (1990) (slip op., at 3), (citing Shau 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, a; 95). Regardless of the ai 
nue we follow—.whether explicit or implied pre-emption 
this state law cause oi action cannot oe sustained. 
A 
Where, as here, Congress has expressly included a broad 
worded pre-emption provision in a comprehensive statu 
such as ERISA, our task of discerning congressional intent 
considerably simplified. In § 514(a) of ERISA, as set for 
in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), Congress provided: 
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this sectio 
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III 
this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws ins 
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employe 
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title ar, 
not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." 
"The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. 
FMC Corp^ supra, at . Its "deliberately expansive 
TSee, e.g.. Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F. 2d 586 (CXI 1981 
(ERISA pre-empts stat* wrongful discharge actions premised on employe 
interference with the attainment of rights under employee benefit plans 
Pave v. RCA Corp., 868 F. 2d 631 (CA3 1989) (same): Sorotky v. Bw 
roughs Corp., S26 F. 2d 794 (CAS 1987) (same). Accord. Covauvy < 
Eastern Associated Coal Corp., W. Va. , 358 S. E. 2d 423 (1986 
Contra, K Man Corp. v. Ponaock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P. 2d 1364 (1981 
Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Cenxrr, 516 F. Supp. 554 (EDNT 19S3 
Savodnik v. Korvetus, inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (EDKY 1980). 
language was "designed to 'establish pension plan- regulation 
as exclusively a federal concern/" PUoVLife, supra, at 46 
(quoting Alessi v. Raybesto^ManhaXUin^bic^' 45lrU. S. 
504, 523 (1981)). • The key-to (514(a) is found-in. the words 
"relate to." ponrress used those words in their broad sense. 
ryjfrtf fop- mnr* limited pre-emption language that would have 
made the clause "applicable only to state laws relating to the _ 
specific subjects covered by &K1SA-" . Shaw, tupra,zt 98. 
Moreover, to underscore its intent that § 514(a)'be .expan-
sively applied, Congress used equally broad language in de-
fining the "State law" that would be pre-empted. Such laws 
include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 
action having the effect of law." *5H(cXl), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1144(c)(1). 
"A law Yelates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal 
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to 
such a plan." Shaw, supra, at 96-97. Under this "broad 
common-sense meaning," a state law may "relate to" a bene-
fit plan, and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not 
specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only 
indirect. Pilot Life, supra, at 47. See also Alessi v. 
Raybestos-Manhattan, live,, supra, at 525. Pre-emption is 
also not precluded simply because a state law is consistent ' 
with ERISA's substantive requirements. Metropolitan Life 
his. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985^—^v 
Notwithstanding its breadth, we have recognized(bmitg^o 
ERISA's pre-emption clause. In Mackey v. LanierCollec 
tion Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825 (19S8), the Court 
held that ERISA did not pre-empt a State's general garnish-
jnent ctatutP. even though it was applied to collect judgments 
against plan participants. Id., at S41. The fact that collec-
tion might burden the administration of a plan did not, by it-
self, compel pre-emption. Moreover, under the plain lan-
guage of § 514(a) the Court has held that only state laws that_ 
relate to benefit vlans are pre-empted. Fort Halifax Pack-
Ing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, IB (1987). Thus, even though 
a state law required payment of severance benefits, which" 
would normally fail within the purview of ERISA, it was not 
pre-empted because the statute QJQ not require the establish^ 
jnent or maintenance of an ongoing plan. Id., at 12. 
Neither of these limitations is appucaoie to this case. We 
are not dealing here with a generally applicable statute that 
makes no reference to. or indeed functions irrespective of, 
the existence of an ERISA plan. Nor is the cost of defend-
ing this lawsuit a mere administrative burden. Here, the 
eyisrenrp nf a p ^ j p n plan is a critical factor in establishing 
liability under the State's wrongful discharge law. As a re-
sult, this cause of action relates not merely to pension bene-
fits, but to the essence of the pension vtan itself. 
We have no difficulty in concluding that the cause of action 
which the Texas Supreme Court recognized here—a claim 
that the employer wrongfully terminated plaintiff primarily 
because of the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or 
paying benefits under the employee's pension fund—"re-
late^] to" an ERISA-covered plan within the meaning of 
§ 514(a), and is therefore pre-empted. 
T*V]e have virtually taken it for granted that state laws 
which are 'specifically designed to affect employee benefit 
plans' are pre-empted under § 514(a)." Mackey, supra, at 
829. In Mackey the statute's express reference to ERISA 
plans established that it was so designed; consequently, it 
was pre-empted. The facts here are slightly different but 
the principle is the same: Th* T»va<; cansp nf action makes _ 
specific reference to. and indeed is premised on, the exist-
ence of a pension plan. In the words of the Texas court, the 
cause of action "allows recovery when the plaintiff proves 
that the principal reason for his termination was the employ-
er's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under 
the employee's pension fund." • 779 S. W..2d,at 71. "Thus," 
2i order to prevail, a plaintiff must plead^and the court must 
find/that'an ERISA plan exists and the employer had a pen-
sion-defeating motive in terminating"the'employmenf: "Be-
cause the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan; this 
judicially created cause of action *relate[s] to" an ERISA 
plan. 
McClendon argues that the pension plan is irrelevant to the 
Texas cause of action because all that is at issue is the em-
ployer's improper motive to avoid its pension obligations. 
The argument misses the point, which is that under the 
Texas court's analysis there simply, is no cause of action if 
there is no plan. 
Similarly unavailing is McClendon's argument that S 514(a) 
is fcmited by the narrower language of § 514(c)(2) which 
provides: 
T h e term 'State' includes a State, any political subdi-
visions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of 
either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, 
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans cov-
ered by this subchapter." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(c)(2). 
McClendon argues that §514(c)(2)'s limiting language 
causes § 514(a) to pre-empt only those state laws that affect 
plan terms, conditions, or administration. Since the cause of 
action recognized by the Texas court does not focus on those 
items but rather on the employer's termination decision, Mc-
Clendon claims that there can be no pre-emption here. 
The flaw in this argument is that it misreads § 514(c)(2) and 
consequently misapprehends its purpose. The ERISA defi-
nition of "State" is found in § 3(10), which defines the term as 
"any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa. Guam, 
Wake Island, and the Canal Zone." 29 U. S. C. § 1002(10). 
Section 514(c)(2) expands, rather than restricts, that defini-
tion for pre-emption purposes in order to "include" state 
agencies and instrumentalities whose actions might not oth-
erwise be considered state law. Had Congress intended to 
restrict ERISA's pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting 
to regulate plan terms and conditions, it surely would not 
have done so by placing the restriction in an adjunct defini-
tion section while using the broad phrase "relate to" in the 
pre-emption section itself. Moreover, if § 514(a) were con-
strued as McClendon urges, the "relate to" language would 
be superfluous—Congress need only have said that "all" state 
laws would be pre-empted. Moreover, our precedents fore-
close this argument. In Mackey the Court held that ERISA 
pre-empted a Georgia garnishment statute that excluded 
from garnishment ERISA plan benefits. Mackey, supra, at 
B2S, and n. 2, 829. Such a law clearly did not regulate the 
terms or conditions of ERISA-covered plans, and yet we 
found pre-emption. Mackey demonstrates that § 514(a) can-
not be read so restrictively. 
The conclusion that the cause of action in this case is pre-
empted by § 514(a) is supported by our understanding of the 
purposes of that provision. Section 514(a) was intended to 
ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uni-
form body of benefit law, the goal was to minimize the admin-
istrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting 
directives among States or between States and the Federal 
Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could 
work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. FMC Corp., 
498 U. S., at (citing Fcrrt Halifax, 482 U. S., at 10-11); 
Shaw, 463 U. S., at 105, and n. 25. Allowing state based ac-
tions like the one at issue here would subject plans and plan 
sponsors to burdens not unlike those that Congress sought to 
foreclose through § 514(a). Particularly disruptive is the po^ 
tential for conflict in substantive law.. It is foreseeable that 
state courts, exercising their common, law powers, might de-
velop different substantive standards applicable to the .samel 
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and em-
ployer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdic-
tion. Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds with the 
goal of uniformity that Congress sought to implement 
B 
Even if there were no express pre-emption in this case, the 
Texas cause of action would be pre-empted because it con-
flicts directly with an ERISA cause of action. McClendon's 
claim falls squarely within the ambit of ERISA § 510, which 
provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a par-
ticipant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which 
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit 
plan. . . err for the purpose of interfering with the attain-
ment of any right to which such participant may become 
entitled under the plan " 29 U. S. C. § 1140 (em-
phasis added). 
By its terms § 510 protects plan participants from termina-
tion motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension 
from vesting. Congress viewed this section as a crucial part 
of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to 
circumvent the provision of promised benefits. S. Rep. 
No. 93-127, pp. 35-36 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 17 
(1973). We have no doubt that this claim is prototypical of 
the kind Congress intended to cover under §510. 
M[T]he mere existence of a federal regulator}' or enforce-
ment scheme," however, even a considerably detailed one, 
"does not by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies." 
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U. S. , (1990) 
(slip op., at 14). Accordingly, *"we must look for special fea-
tures warranting pre-emption/" Ibid, (quoting Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 
471 U. S. 707, 719 (1985)). 
Of particular relevance in this inquiry is § 502(a)—ERISA's 
civil enforcement mechanism. That section as set forth in 29 
U. S. C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (e), provides, in pertinent part: 
"A civil action may be brought— 
"(3) by a participant... (A) to enjoin any act or prac-
tice which violates any provision of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to en-
force any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan; 
"(e) (1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) 
of this section, the district courts of the United States 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under 
this subchapter brought by . . . a participant." (Em-
• phasis added.) 
In PilovLife we examined this section at some length and 
explained that Congress intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive 
remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA, including those 
provided by § 510: 
• TIThe detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a com-
- prehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a 
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims 
settlement procedures against the public interest in en-
couraging the formation of employee benefit plans. • The 
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain reme-
dies andthe exclusion of others under the federal schez 
would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan para 
pants and? beneficiaries werevfree4to obtain remedi 
under state-law that Congress rejected in ERISA.:? 'T 
six, carefully integrated civil.-enforcement provision 
found in § 502(a) of the- statute as finally enacted . -, 
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend 
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorp 
rate expressly.'" - 481 U. S., at 54 (quoting Massach 
$etis Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134,1< 
( 1 9 8 5 ) ^ _ 
rJi is dear to us that the exclusive remedy proviaed k 
1502(a) is precisely the kind of "'special featur[e]'".thj 
J Varrant(s].pre-emption'" in this case. English, supra, i 
f (slip op.f. at 14); see also Automated Medical, supra, i 
[719. As we explained in Pilot Life, ERISA's legislative hi! 
Itory makes clear that "the pre-emptive force of § 502(a) wa 
{modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by § 301 of th 
fLabor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat 
156, 29 U. S. C. § 185." 481 U. S., at 52; id., at 54-55 (citinj 
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974)). "Congres 
was well aware that the powerful pre-emptive force of § 30: 
of the LMRA displaced" all state-law claims, "even when th* 
state action purported to authorize a remedy unavailabh 
under the federal provision." Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 55 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58 (1987) 
we again drew upon the parallel between § 502(a) and § 301 o: 
the LMRA to support our conclusion that the pre-emptive ef-
fect of § 502(a) was so complete that an ERISA pre-emptior 
defense provides a sufficient basis for removal of a cause oi 
action to the federal forum notwithstanding the traditional 
limitation imposed by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. 
^ L at 64-67. ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ 
w^TeTyontSly stffneievidence in concluding that the re-
quirements of conflict pre-emption are satisfied in this case. 
Unquestionably, the Texas cause of action purports to pro-
vide a remedy for the violation of a right expressly guaran-
teed by § 510 and exclusively enforced by § 502(a). Accord-
ingly we hold that "*[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be 
assumed that the activities which a State purports to regu-
late are protected" by §510 of ERISA, "due regard for the 
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must 
yield.'" Cf. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 
486 U. S. 399, 409, n. 8 (1988). 
The preceding discussion also responds to the Texas court's 
attempt to distinguish this case as not one within ERISA's 
purview. Not only is § 502(a) the exclusive remedy for vin-
dicating § 510-protected rights, there is no basis in § 502(aVs 
language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek 
"pension benefits." It is clear that the relief requested here 
is well within the power of federal courts to provide. Conse-
quently, it is no answer to a pre-emption argument that a 
particular plaintiff is not. seeking recovery of pension 
benefits, k 
The judgment of the Texas Supreme Court is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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